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Abstract
As organisations around the world have embraced the Internet and e-Commerce, so too
have commercial criminals. e-Fraud is a multi-billion dollar threat to organisations, and like
any other crime, these e-Crimes should be brought to justice. The process of gathering
electronic evidence of an e-Fraud is known as forensic computing. This paper addresses the
issues that law enforcement, private forensic specialists, network administrators, and eBusinesses face when attempting to prosecute e-Crimes. Through a research forum focus
group these issues were identified and prioritized so that the computer forensic community
can then identify the existing strengths, weaknesses and threats, and thereby introduce a
strategy that allocates scarce resources and skills to the most needed areas.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
As computers become more prevalent in everyday life, our reliance upon them will continue
to increase. Everything from ATM’s and telephones, all the way to personal desktop
computers and the online world of the Internet, are controlled by computer chips that
process the countless number of bits of information passing through each minute of the day.
However, with this increased reliance upon computers comes an increase in vulnerability.
E-Commerce has been increasing at an unprecedented rate over the past few years. While
this is still primarily business-to-business, it is expected that business to consumer eCommerce will increase just as rapidly with consumers becoming more confident in the
security of online trading. However, a major threat to the success of e-Commerce, and to the
world as a whole, is e-Crime. Like any crime, e-Crime should be investigated and
prosecuted where necessary. Computer forensics describes the practice of retrieving
evidence in the form of data from a computer that relates to a crime in a manner that meets
the requirements of the given legal system. Computer forensics evidence needs to be
handled with the same care that physical evidence requires. However, there is added
complexity due to the technical nature of computer based evidence and the number of steps
required in the computer forensics methodology process followed (refer Tennyenhuis and
Jamieson, 2002)
This paper represents the first stage in a wider study being conducted to develop a
framework of forensic computing principles that businesses can build into their computer
security policies and response plans. This will be developed in consultation with each of the
communities identified below, thereby promoting an increased level of cooperation, and
ensuring that the concerns of all parties are realised. Specifically, this paper explores the
issues that the forensic computing world faces, and the difficulties that prevent many eCrimes being brought to justice.
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E-COMMERCE
E-Commerce at its broadest can be defined as “Any type of business transaction or
interaction in which the participants operate or transact business or conduct their trade
electronically” (NOIE, 2000:2).
A recent survey by KPMG (2001) found that 62% of the world’s largest companies across 12
countries are involved in e-Commerce as part of their business. 97% of respondents to the
Computer Crime and Security Survey (CSI, 2001) reported that their organisation have
websites, and 47% conduct e-Commerce on these sites. Indeed, it is estimated that eCommerce generated about US$132 billion in revenue worldwide in the year 2000 alone,
and that figure is rising each year (ActivMediaResearch, 2000).
“As levels of connection to global information networks increase, so too does the potential
number of people wishing to engage in creating and spreading electronic tools for fraud,
damage or impersonation” (ACPR, 2000:26). As a result, in 1999 businesses spent an
estimated $6.4US billion on computer security (Mertl, 2000). At the same time, the number
of known vulnerabilities has been increasing at an increasing rate. CERT reported 417
vulnerabilities in 1999. The following year, CERT reported 1,090, and in 2001, 2,437
vulnerabilities (CERT, 2001).

E-CRIMES
E-Crime is defined as “offences where a computer is used as a tool in the commission of an
offence, or as a target of an offence, or used as a storage device in the commission of an
offence” (ACPR, 2000:xxi). Thus, an e-Crime is a crime that is either committed on a
computer, such as ‘hacking’ and e-Fraud, or more traditional crimes where information about
a crime is stored on a computer, such as financial records relating to a fraud. Computer
forensics is used to investigate both of these types. Forensic computing is also used where
evidence is gathered for civil cases. It may be that the possibility of a criminal prosecution is
minimal, but an organisation may still attempt to recover losses through civil action. To
ensure that the evidence produced is of the utmost quality, forensic computing principles
and procedures should be followed at all times, for example, refer to phases and steps in a
detailed computer forensics methodology provided by Tennyenhuis and Jamieson (2002).
ACPR (2000) lists several examples of e-Crime:
•

Theft of telecommunications services;

•

Communications in furtherance of criminal conspiracies;

•

Information piracy, counterfeiting and forgery;

•

Dissemination of offensive material;

•

Electronic money laundering and tax evasion;

•

Electronic vandalism and terrorism;

•

Sales and investment fraud;

•

Illegal interception of telecommunications; and

• Electronic funds transfer fraud.
Other types of e-Fraud identified by KPMG Forensic Accounting (2001) include crimes such
as setting up a false Internet shopfront or gambling service, the trafficking of credit card
numbers, placing fraudulent purchase orders, or unauthorised use of online banking
facilities. The possibilities of types of e-Crime are as endless as the possibilities for
legitimate use of e-Commerce.
A 1999 survey by the Victorian Police and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT, 1999) found that
one third of respondents had been attacked in the previous twelve months. Of these
companies that reported being aware of an intrusion, 83% of companies reported being
attacked from an internal source, while 58% had been attacked by an external source. To
corroborate, the CSI (2001) survey reports that 85% of their respondents detected computer
security breaches within the past twelve months and 64% acknowledged financial losses
due to computer breaches. Of the 186 respondents who were willing and able to quantify
their financial losses due to these incidents, a total of US$377,828,700 was lost. This is in
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stark contrast to the previous year, when 249 organisations reported a loss of only
US$265,589,940, which itself was up from the average total of US$120,240,180 for the three
years leading up to 2000.
However, of the computer security incidents that are reported to law enforcement, it seems
that only a small number are ever investigated, or reach the stage of prosecution. No clear
statistics exist, but anecdotal evidence suggests that law enforcement could only ever hope
to investigate a very small percentage of e-Crimes. “As far as the criminal law is concerned,
computer forensics has come a long way. But the field is still far from the position in which
malicious hackers are, like ordinary criminals, caught and prosecuted often enough to
provide some sort of deterrent.” (The Economist, IT section, 1 May 2001:1)

FORENSIC COMPUTING
Computer forensics refers to the legal processes, rules of evidence, court procedures, and
forensic practices used to investigate e-Crimes. McKemmish (2001:1) defines it as “… the
process of identifying, preserving, analysing, and presenting digital evidence in a manner
that is legally acceptable in any legal proceeding (i.e. court of law or other judicial or
administrative hearing)”.
Specifically, computer forensics is the application of scientific, forensically sound procedures
in the collection, analysis, and presentation of electronic data. This data usually relates to a
crime, however, these procedures are also commonly used when retrieving data for civil
matters, such as investigation alleged misuse of corporate computer systems. For computer
evidence to be accepted in a court of law, the forensic investigation process must identify,
preserve, examine, and document any computer evidence retrieved. This means that the
data must not be compromised in any way. It must be able to be proven that the data is a
true representation of what happened, that it can not have been modified in any way, either
by the intruder themselves, or the collection and examination tools. In other words, the chain
of custody must be able to be established (Sommer, 1998).
Mc Kemmish (2001) identifies three distinct types of forensic computing:
•

Digital Evidence Recovery – Involves the examination of electronic devices for
information relating to a crime, and the processes involved in collecting relevant
data.

•

Cyber/Intrusion Forensics – Involves detecting computer security breaches,
identifying and preserving digital evidence.

•

Forensic Data Analysis – Involves identifying anomalies in large data sets that
may indicate illegal or improper acts.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As the field of computer forensics is relatively new and still in its infancy, little literary work
exists. Little is known of the reasons why such a small percentage of computer criminals are
ever brought to justice. The aim of this research is to identify the issues that prevent the
successful prosecution of e-Crimes.
Four communities have been identified within the computer forensics field:
•

Law enforcement/ Government Regulators.

•

Private forensic computing providers,

•

Computer Security Professional/ Network Administrator.

• Academia.
This study is concerned with identifying the issues that the intrusion forensic community
faces, and is using exploratory methods to discover these issues. The study is not
attempting to represent the entire population, and therefore it is not necessary to gather a
random sample (Blaikie, 2000:30). Rather, this study chose experts or leaders in each of the
participating communities to ensure representative viewpoints whilst trying to explore the
issues they encounter. In this particular case, the number of professionals within the
computer forensic communities in Australia is rather small [approximately forty personnel
within the law enforcement community (ACPR, 2000)].
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In order to extract the primary issues, a small focus group was conducted with 8 key players
from the participating communities in the intrusion forensic environment. This group
represents very experienced and knowledgeable practitioners including heads of regulatory
agencies, partners in major consulting organisations, and senior law enforcement personnel,
who have major responsibilities for the prevention, detection, investigation and presentation
of evidence relating to e-Crime. As it is unlikely that a single, or even a few experts alone,
would posses the experience to be able to identify all the issues, a round table of key
players was required to yield a comprehensive list of issues. This research method has
become more popular in social research over recent years, and provides greater insight into
why certain opinions are held (Blaikie, 2000:234).
To ensure that the issues identified are reliable, divergent opinions need to be sought.
Feedback-based convergence is then used to rank the issues. Therefore a ranking-type
Delphi study, designed to elicit the opinion of a panel of experts through iterative controlled
feedback, was chosen as the research method for this study (Schmidt et al., 2001). The
focus group survey was divided into three phases according to the model developed by
Schmidt (1997). The first phase involved ‘brainstorming’ in which, after a short introduction
to the topic area by the researcher, the participants had the opportunity to raise as many
issues as possible, including issues they had identified prior to the round table. The second
phase involved an in-depth, unstructured discussion amongst the participants of the issues
raised. At many stages, the discussion diverged and identified further issues not raised
during the first phase. These new issues were added to the list as they arose by the
researcher observing the discussions. At the same time, the participants also identified
several issues raised during the first phase that seemed to be duplicates, or irrelevant for
this topic area, and were deleted from the list. Finally, each of the issues raised were
assigned a number, and the participants were asked to both rank the issues in order of
importance, and indicate their relative level of importance on a Delphi coding form.
We acknowledge that this method of data collection has several disadvantages. Firstly, as
already discussed, the participants were not chosen randomly, and we do not claim that this
group is representative, although they were acknowledged experts within their communities.
Other disadvantages include the possibility that participants may hide their views, difficulty in
coding the responses, possible domination of proceedings by some persons, and possible
non-participation by some people (Sarantakos, 1998:180-185).
The round table was conducted in a conference room within the School of Information
Systems, Technology and Management at the University of New South Wales.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The issues were categorised by the respondents into one of four categories; social,
organisational, legal, or technical issues. The difference in the importance levels assigned to
the major issues across these categories was minimal, and therefore not discussed in any
great detail here. The issues identified are listed in order of assigned importance2 as shown
below. Results from each area are shown below together with a brief discussion of the two
most important issues identified under each of the categories.
Social Issues
Issues arising from the relationships between each of the identified communities were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Communication between the identified communities
Education of public and professionals
Lack of incident reporting
Cooperation with ISP’s, security groups.
Loss of confidence in law enforcement
Cost of investigations
Combination of types of evidence – traditional vs. electronic
Benefits of reporting

2 Those issues listed in italics were given the same rank by the respondents.
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9. Ethics
10. Private sector/private sector responsibilities, social responsibilities
11. Anonymity of computers
Social Issues Discussion
•

Communication between the identified communities
•

Public/private sectors (cooperation and responsibilities)

• Security/law enforcement etc.
This issue refers to the perceived lack of communication between the different communities.
For example, law enforcement and government regulators should communicate with
organisations to explain what the dangers are, what they should do in the event of an
incident (to do with collecting evidence in a forensically sound manner), who to call, etc…
Conversely, law enforcement should be aware of the capabilities and responsibilities that
companies have when responding to incidents.
Law enforcement around the world have recognised the need to cooperate with the private
sector if they are to be able to successfully meet the challenge of enforcing law in the cyber
word. Strategies need to be developed in consultation with all the players to mutually protect
critical infrastructure, manage demand, and keep the electronic world safe (ACPR, 2001).
Also recognised is the need for private sector leadership and self-regulation wherever
possible. Furthermore, there is a need to develop a mutual structure in order to minimise the
duplication of effort between both the public and private sectors. In particular, law
enforcement needs to develop outreach programs to assist businesses and the public
protect themselves in the electronic environment.
• Education of public and security professionals
There is a need to educate the public and security professionals on what they need to do to
aid in an investigation. For example, businesses see the need for a guideline on the
essential common log files that law enforcement typically require, and instructions on how to
record, verify, and store those logs in a manner that will satisfy a criminal court.
One of the main reasons cited for the low level of reporting of e-Crime to law enforcement is
the perception that they will not be able to anything. CSI (2001) reported that only 36% of
organisations that noticed intrusions reported them to the police. This figure was again up
significantly from 25% the previous year, and only 16% in 1996. While an improvement has
been made, education programs should be put in place to inform organisations of the
capabilities of law enforcement, and to help those organisations to help themselves, and
thereby lower the load put on the police. A survey (DTT, 1999) indicated that the most
important reason why organisations would report an incident to law enforcement would be if
they were confident in the ability of police to make a successful prosecution.
Organisational Issues
Issues that exist within a particular organisation e.g. lack of management support within the
particular organisation:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Lack of law enforcement resources
Structure of law enforcement e.g. National vs. State based
Lack of evidence preservation
Central incident reporting
Brain drain in law enforcement
Risk management/prevention
Focused on external threats vs. internal threats
Insurance/costs
Companies do not work intrusion detection systems to take them into court
Proportionality of the crime
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Organisational Issues Discussion
• Lack of law enforcement resources
One of the reasons cited for the lack of confidence in the abilities of law enforcement is the
perceived lack of resources assigned to e-Crime. With a push for more visible policing and a
focus on crimes of violence, e-Crime can often be considered a minor issue. However, with
the massive amounts of money involved in e-Commerce, and the heavy reliance that most
sectors now have upon it, governments need to recognise this increased demand.
Of particular interest is the ability of law enforcement to retain skilled staff. There is a
shortage of quality courses on forensic computing available, and many of these are only
available to law enforcement. Having poured resources into training staff, law enforcement
commonly find that they are ‘poached’ by private enterprise who offer up to two or three
times the wages that law enforcement are able to offer. This is compounded by the
perceived lack of a valid career path for specialists within traditionally structured law
enforcement. Coupled with a lack of resources for training and equipment, this does little to
retain the loyalty of officers. Across Australia, law enforcement looses an average of one
third of their specialist staff each year (ACPR, 2000) This phenomenon is known as the
‘brain drain’ (Etter, 2001).
While the ‘brain drain’ is a major problem for law enforcement trying to retain skilled
investigators, there is a positive side to it. Forensic computing is a cross between computing
and the law, and it has been said that it is easier to teach a skilled law enforcement officer
the technical skills required for specialist roles than it is to instil in skilled specialist the
principles of evidence collection and handling. By leaving law enforcement, officers are
taking their knowledge of the law, and valid forensic computing principles into the private
sector. This helps to disseminate knowledge throughout the community, and lowers the
workload of law enforcement. Furthermore, more and more commonly, the ‘legwork’ of
investigations is being handled by private forensic companies again lowering the demand on
law enforcement resources. It is essential that these organisations have a clear
understanding of forensic computing law and evidence handling principles and procedures.
• Structure of law enforcement e.g. National vs. State based
In Australia, and many other countries, the responsibility for law enforcement lies with the
states or territories within the land. However, some of the challenges that are posed by eCrime are its global reach and the potential for deliberate exploitation of sovereignty and
jurisdictional issues (ACPR, 2001). Furthermore, there is a need to cooperate on a national,
if not international basis, to ensure that work is not duplicated, and that scarce resources are
used in the most effective manner. A national e-Crime desk that has the power to coordinate investigations and liaise with international law enforcement has been recommended
as a way of addressing this issue. (ACPR, 2000).
• Lack of evidence preservation
Many organisations are unaware of forensic computing principles. Simple procedures, such
as printing out logs, signing, dating, and storing in a safe (with limited access) would go a
long way to aiding prosecutions. A matter as simple as having the correct system time
recorded is important. If it is incorrect, this may undermine the reliability of what could
otherwise be useful evidence. Again, education is a major issue.
• Central incident reporting
As already discussed, some degree of central incident reporting is required. This allows for
better allocation of resources, and enables law enforcement to identify trends or widespread
crime. There are many arguments for a central incident reporting scheme that has the power
to allocate investigations to various law enforcement agencies and to provide a central point
for international cooperation between law enforcement agencies to combat e-Crime.
Legal Issues
The legal environment and any laws that are an issue when carrying out computer forensic
investigations:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Ability to investigate in real time
Lack of confidence in courts – lack of knowledge
Active retaliation
Which Acts to prosecute under – civil or criminal
Entrapment

Legal Issues Discussion
• Ability to investigate in real time
Legislators throughout the world are gradually being forced to update legislation to handle eCrime. While many of the existing laws have so far proved adequate, laws such as those
that work around international jurisdictional boundaries are now required. Furthermore, old
search warrant and seizure laws are often incompatible with investigations involving
computer systems. Of particular interest though, is the ability to work in real-time. Law
enforcement is traditionally a slow process, and when cross-jurisdictional issues are
introduced, the process is horrendously slow. Given that across many parts of Europe and
the U.K., businesses have a policy of only storing log files for a period of 24-48 hours before
they are recycled, time can become a critical success factor of an investigation. “Courts will
not convict individuals of those crimes unless admissible evidence is forthcoming. Thus it is
probable that individually or collectively, law enforcement agencies will need to develop a
capacity to respond to life threatening and serious electronic crimes in real-time” (ACPR
2000:27).
• Lack of confidence in courts – lack of knowledge
This issue contained to two separate concerns. Firstly, there is a perceived lack of
confidence that the courts, judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and juries will be able to
understand computer evidence and the technical issues that arise in its’ recovery. Indeed,
law enforcement can build a watertight case, but if the prosecutor does not understand what
the evidence is or how it was collected, then all the effort may be unfruitful
The other concern is that case law may be defined by judges who are ill informed or not
aware of all the issues involved. Where legislation is not specific, a judge may decide on the
law and then that decision may be used a precedent in following cases. For example, in
some jurisdictions it is not clear if a warrant for seizure of computer equipment is issued for a
specific time, whether the time restriction also applies to the analysis of data retrieved. A
judge who does not realise that it is almost impossible to do a proper search within a short
time frame may decide that law enforcement are restricted to the time allowed by the search
warrant.
Technical Issues
Issues that arise through the use of automated tools, and the shortcomings of those tools:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Accreditation of tools
Continuity of evidence and proof that evidence is correct
Lost evidence
Detection difficulties
Reporting mechanisms and standards
Encryption difficulties
Inability to detect truly novel attacks

Technical Issues Discussion
• Accreditation of tools
The main problems identified by the focus group for the accreditation of tools involved high
level of false alarms, testing and certification of tools, and use of appropriate hardware and
software to run these tools. Currently, forensic computing and computer security tools are
usually proprietary software. These tools are rarely ‘accredited’ by independent, third party
assessors as to the veracity of the claims made by the software vendors. Members of both
the law enforcement and private forensic communities stressed the need for accreditation of
forensic tools. This should save a lot of time in court where the exact operation of a tool can
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come into question. This will also add more weight to the perceived integrity and accuracy
the results and more importantly, should identify any weaknesses and ensure only high
quality software tools are used.
The accreditation body needs to be able and willing to provide expert evidence as to the
accreditation process in the event of a challenge in court. For this reason, some government
agencies, whilst capable of performing the accreditation, are unsuitable (restricted by
national security requirements).
Having said this, accreditation of tools could be extremely difficult. Even if an independent
accreditor was appointed, the sheer number of tools and circumstances could overwhelm
them. Questions such as “Is the accreditation valid if a patch or slightly different version is
released?” complicate the issue. There could also be reluctance on the part of some who
have developed their own tools to submit them for accreditation as they do not want to
divulge their secrets.
• Continuity of evidence and proof that evidence is correct
“The preservation of digital evidence is a critical element in the forensic process, Given the
potential likelihood of judicial scrutiny in a court of law, it is imperative that any presentation
of electronically stored data be carried out in a manner that is as least intrusive as possible
… Where changes occur during a forensic examination, the nature, extent and reason for
such a change should be properly accounted for” (McKemmish, 2001:1).
The rules of evidence apply to electronic evidence just as it does to any other form of
evidence. One of the key principles in any investigation is the preservation of a chain of
custody over any evidence. This can be particularly hard to do with computer evidence, and
it can also be very simple. Technically, proving a chain of custody over evidence produced
as the output of a software tool can be difficult. Particularly in the case of network intrusions
where the intruder has gained administrator privileges, how can one prove that the intruder
did not tamper with the evidence? It is also difficult to prove that the software tool was
installed, configured and operating properly. Accreditation of the tool and its operator may go
some way to relieve this issue, but more needs to be done on the technical security of the
tools.

CONCLUSION
While e-Commerce is rapidly spreading and offers an almost limitless world of opportunity, it
brings with it an increase in vulnerability. Traditional crimes such as fraud now often need a
forensic computing specialist to gather evidence, and at the same time a whole new type of
crime (e-Crime) has emerged. In order to adequately address the challenges that e-Crime
throws in the face of the wider community, e-Businesses, law enforcement, and private
security professionals must co-ordinate their efforts, and work together.
Having identified some of the key issues and ranked their relative importance, this paper
sets the foundations for continuing work to help the community in its fight against e-Crime.
With this work as a basis, we can now set forth a plan and research agenda to begin to
address these issues. This will be done firstly through the production of a guideline for
businesses when developing computer security policies. This guideline will help disseminate
knowledge throughout the community, and at the same time promote communication and
co-operation between all of the identified forensic computing communities.
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